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Resumen
El presente trabajo examina el pensamiento científico
desde el modelo atribucional. Desde el punto de vista clásico,
la ciencia fue definida como el producto de un conocimiento
objetivo de una realidad externa  que seguía sus propias leyes,
independientemente del observador que trataba de descubrir
sus secretos. Sin embargo, también es incorrecto considerar la
ciencia como consecuencia de una mente totalmente irracio-
nal, completamente inmersa en los patrones atribucionales del
investigador que a pesar de toda evidencia en contra, continúa
sosteniendo los hechos que sus percepciones le permiten ver.
La Teoría de la Atribución permite un cambio gradual del sis-
tema de creencias o atribuciones de la gente en general y del
científico en particular, cuando tales creencias prueban ser in-
suficientes o no funcionales para explicar un medio que está
continuamente interactuando con el individuo y corrigiendo
sus atribuciones. Obviamente se trata de un proceso lento, des-
de que implica ir cambiando y a veces sustituyendo creencias
en forma parcial y no en forma completa o repentina. Esta
perspectiva permitiría entender a la ciencia como una cons-
trucción que depende de un sistema de conocimiento. Este sis-
tema estaría garantizado por la racionalidad a través de prue-
bas de contrastación y no es ni un sistema objetivo, aséptico  y
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perfectamente racional ni el reino de la pura irracionalidad y
atribución, indiferente a cualquier signo claro de disfunciona-
lidad. 
Palabras clave: Ciencia - pensamiento - atribución - irracionali-
dad - constructivismo.
Abstract
This paper will examine scientific thinking from the attri-
bution model. According to the classical view, science was
defined as the product of objective knowledge of an external
reality which followed its own laws, independently from the
observer who tried to uncover its secrets. Despite that, it is also
incorrect to understand science as the consequence of a totally
irrational mind, completely immersed in the attribution pat-
terns of the researcher who, against all evidence to the con-
trary, continues holding exclusively the facts which his percep-
tion allows him to see. The cognitive theory of attribution per-
mits a gradual change from the belief or attribution system of
people in general and scientists in particular, whenever such
beliefs prove to be insufficient or non-functional for explain-
ing an environment that is constantly interacting with the indi-
vidual, offering feedback and correcting his attributions. It is
obviously a slow process, since it implies changing and some-
times substituting beliefs, partially and not wholly or sudden-
ly. This perspective would ground an understanding of science
as a construction dependent on a system of knowledge. This
system would be warranted by rationality through contrasting
tests, and it is not an objective, aseptic, and perfectly rational
system; nor is it the reign of pure irrationality, and attribution,
reluctant to any clear signs of non-functionality.
Key words: Science - thinking - attribution - irrationality -
constructivism.
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This paper will examine scientific thinking from the attribution model
as an alternative approach to an inquiry into the way irrationality seeps into
science just as into any decision-making process. 
Generally speaking, the basic activity of human beings is to perceive
and know the world where he lives. In this sense, cognition is a defining
characteristics of the human subject. He does not process information by
merely storing it; he does so actively, organizing and codifying, and in gen-
eral personalizing the information he receives. Human cognition is fre-
quently far from logical and rational; very often reasoning is non-logical
(Evans, 1972). It follows mental models rather than formal rules (Johnson-
Laird, 1983). Mental models are dynamic and temporary representations
based on our beliefs about the world; they become actual when we face par-
ticular projects or when we must solve problems (Gentner, & Stevens,
1983; Johnson-Laird, 1983).
Cognitive strategies are active processes of response and initiative to
keep up acquired achievements and to be able to carry on our tasks, in spite
of potential difficulties. Optimism, defencelessness, vigilance, avoidance,
risk-taking and other strategies are used to preserve the subject’s self-image
and world-view. From this standpoint, cognitive strategies are a dense, and
inextricable organization of ideas, feelings, images, activations, and actions
(Cantor, & Zirkel, 1990).
Human knowledge is characterized by applying certain ways of pro-
cessing information which are not strictly logical and rational. Although
this does not imply falling into irrationality, human cognition typically
makes use of systems that avoid the long process of deduction and infer-
ence, and chooses simpler systems. Cognitive heuristics are simple and
easy rules of cognition which lead to a prompt solution of a given prob-
lem, although it is not always the strictly logical one (Huici, & Moya,
1994). Leyens, and Codol (1990) state that the very existence of cognitive
heuristics indicates that human cognition is psychological rather than log-
ical.
The theory of attribution has been developed within the context of this
understanding of human knowledge. It origins lie in social psychology
(Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967, 1971) but it belongs in the area of personality
psychology (Weiner, 1990), both as regards the functioning of the process
and its consequences on the subject who does the attribution (Moreno
Jimenez, & Peñacoba Puente, 1996). The theory of attribution in its wider
sense refers to a person’s will to understand the causes and implications of
the events he witnesses and experiences.
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Several years ago, Heider noted that our actions are controlled by our
perception of an event rather than by what actually happens. In the words
of Epictetus   
“People are not upset by facts, they are upset by their
thoughts about facts” (quoted by Ellis, 1994, p. 85).
The core of the theory of attribution is to bridge the gap between the
information that comes from the outside world and the meaning ascribed to
it by the subject. Each person has his own mental image of real life, both
global and partial: a construct. It discriminates within real life and, in that
way, is no more cognitive than emotional or motive oriented (Kelly, 1995).
The process of attribution includes personal differences, biases, and distor-
tions; it is thus far from constituting a logical process. Biases in the attribu-
tion process indicate that the subject is not a logical processor of the infor-
mation received; both rationalization and rationality play a role in it.
Kelly maintains that the operating principles of the plain man and of
the scientist are identical: they both lay down hypotheses, work out verifi-
cation experiments and modify their theories. Just as the scientist, the plain
man observes -that is, he builds constructs about real life-; he creates theo-
ries (he therefore organizes his constructs in a consistent system of mean-
ing); predicts and anticipates phenomena (in other words, he organizes his
constructs in order to guide his behaviour and predict forthcoming events).
If both scientists and plain men function in the same way, how far does the
scientist refrain from making attributions regarding methodology and theo-
ries?  In view of the paradigm developed at a given time and place, the kind
of scientific literature consulted, the research team he belongs to, can we
not rightly say that the scientist builds up a style of attribution which leads
him to perceive some connections to the detriment of others? In other
words, just as the life history of each individual leads him to develop a style
of attribution in the face of events in general, would the researcher develop
a scientific attribution style according to his scientific story?
The method chosen operates as a guarantee of scientific knowledge in
so far as it allows for specifications of the conditions whereby connections
are verified, or not. Is it chosen in absolute freedom? If the scientist attrib-
utes a trait of stability to a given phenomenon, for example, he will check
results through a correlational method. On the other hand, if he attributes a
variable property to it, he will prefer a method of analysis of variance.
Back in 1620, Francis Bacon had already referred to distortions in per-
ception and knowledge. He thus indicated that human understanding pre-
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sumes a greater order and similarities in objects than what it actually comes
across; that once a statement has been established, it forces its own confir-
mation. And also that the scientist is willing to believe whatever he prefers.
This tendency in human cognition could be prevented through the strict
compliance of a series of formal procedures in evaluating the consequences
of theories.
The notion of  knowledge underlying the classical concept of science
showed an objective researcher at the observation. According to this view
of the cognitive process, perception reflects a reality that is independent
from the observer. The aim of scientific research is to discover certain facts
that presumes the existence of a reality outside the researcher, which must
be apprehended through the senses, thus turning it into something that
belongs to our knowledge. This classical science lies in a causal-linear
model for its hypotheses.
With the development of Constructivism as a new theoretical model of
the process of knowledge, there comes a change in the concept of science.
If reality does not exist as an objective fact, but it is an individual construc-
tion that is co-constructed between the subject and his environment, the
researcher is involved in the field of observation and, consequently, affects
results through his personal viewpoint. This means that knowledge is
enmeshed in subjectivity. No organism can manage to acknowledge,
describe or copy reality. It can only build a model which somehow resem-
bles it. An observer who is involved in the field of observation, influences
the object by his very presence and he does so from his conceptual frame-
work. He will only observe what his map allows him to pinpoint.
The constitution of individual, socio-cultural and psycho-familiar
engrams favour the creation of a peculiar outline or map of what we term
reality, which leads us to see that and not something else.
The objects of scientific research will vary according to the norms,
guidelines, values and beliefs of a scientific society at a given point in time.
If  we think of the context where actions take place as a matrix of meanings,
each scientific society will be able to insert a set of relevant components
worth underscoring. 
Kuhn (1962) from a socio-historical approach to science, has come to
the conclusion that it is impossible to define objective criteria of rationali-
ty. At most, at a particular time in history and within a particular group of
scientists, there may be a consensus on a paradigm or universally acknowl-
edged scientific achievement. During a given period, scientists will refer to
it when solving the problems they are faced with. Not only does a paradigm
explain important variables, it also organizes our worldview, suggests what
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data we are ready to choose, what inferences we are able to deduct from
data and which of the various inferences will be tested.
Kuhn pointed out that scientists do not give up their paradigms easily.
They only do it when one or several of the following kinds of reasons are
present: when there is a relevant amount of empirical data that indicate that
inferences drawn from the paradigm are false; whenever there is a logical
inconsistency in connection with the paradigm; when the paradigm has no
pragmatic value and fails at solving important problems, and whenever
there is an alternative paradigm that proves better at accounting for empir-
ical findings and solving problems (Di Giuseppe, 1991).
The history of changes in paradigms in science reveals that scientists
were able to explain a wider range of natural phenomena, and even attain-
ing a higher accuracy in those which they already knew about.
Nevertheless, progress was only achieved when they managed to leave out
the meanings, values, beliefs, and methodology previously acknowledged
by the current paradigm and when new knowledge substituted them.
Thus, the onset of a new theory is heralded by a period of profound
instability and insecurity. This is so because it becomes impossible to give
satisfactory answers to the enigma posed by anomalies (judged as such by
the previous paradigm). The failure of existent rules is the first step in the
search for new ones.
This offers good proof that any observable evidence can be accounted
for by accommodating to the hypotheses provided by whatever epistemo-
logical model has been chosen. 
“Part of the answer, both obvious and important, can be
found by noting, in the first place, something that scientists never
do, not even when they face grave and prolonged anomalies. Even
if they start losing faith and, later on, consider other alternatives,
they never give up the paradigm that has led them to a crisis.  In
other words, they do not take anomalies as negative examples,
although that is precisely what they are, in the language of the
philosophy of science” (Kuhn, 1973, p. 113).
The problem is that once the paradigm status has been reached; that is,
a normative and systematic code has been adopted, a scientific theory can
only prove that it is non-valid once an alternative candidate has been found
to take up its place. The decision to reject a paradigm and admit its replace-
ment simultaneously implies the decision to adopt another one. The judge-
ment leading to this decision arises from comparing both models.
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Models, insofar as they result from variables ruling various contexts,
are determined by factors that range from social, political, and economic
situations to culture itself. These factors forge the soil used to ground the
new paradigms and question the dominant ones.
Coming back to the cognitive functioning of scientists, any new
thought will have to adapt to a previous design of conceptual structures.
This will preclude any new abstraction from generating a contradiction with
whatever has been learnt before. If there is an anomaly, it is either justified
within the old structure or old structures are modified.
Scientific knowledge, therefore, just as any other knowledge is a pat-
tern which adapts to a previous conceptual model. It may be  widened and
redefined when interaction with other observers connects it to other maps
based on different conceptual structures.
The cognitive theory of attribution includes the possibility of changing
people’s world theory. This implies that they can find models which
respond more accurately to their welfare needs. With this approach and
from his individual viewpoint, the researcher can surpass the vicious circle
which would entrap science from a strict constructivistic perspective.  
“People cannot avoid working out theories on the world,
their interpersonal relationships, and about themselves. These
theories, patterns or paradigms can guide people to adequately
cope with their environment or lead to deficient coping and psy-
chopathology.” (DiGiuseppe, 1991, p. 175).  
At the same time, the theory presupposes an acknowledgement and
refutation of disturbing beliefs (irrational), and their substitution for func-
tional and more efficient ones. If we apply it to scientific knowledge, it
allows for correction of the current attributive model and its replacement by
a more efficient one. 
Ellis (1994) states along this line, and from a critical constructivism,
that although every theory, and even all facts, are human constructions, we
can temporarily accept that for all practical purposes one piece of knowl-
edge is probably better than another.
By now, nobody can deny that previous knowledge is part and parcel
of perception, or state that we can work with pure observations, without a
grounding theory. It is impossible to maintain that facts speak for them-
selves. Both problems: theory-biased observation and inductive inference,
have led to a re-examination of justification criteria. In general, whenever
an anomaly is found in a theory, scientists will try to find an account of the
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flaw in auxiliary theories, rather than refuting the theory itself. From the
standpoint of cognitive theory, in the event of disturbing beliefs or attribu-
tions; that is, when people tend to lose their perspective and expect things
to be different from what they really are, the point is not to change the
whole belief system, but only those beliefs that are judged to cause non-
functional emotions or behaviour. In other words, there are no radical and
absolute changes in someone’s belief system whenever a case of non-func-
tioning is perceived. The point is to modify some beliefs by pointing out
their lack of logic or consistency, proving that things do not actually hap-
pen as the person believes they do, checking whether the belief is useless
and finding a new one.
“Cognitive theory suggests that the cognitive apparatus is
not able to perceive (or represent) reality directly. There is an
interaction between internal and external phenomena operating
over the human nervous system. Therefore, human conscious
experience does not unilaterally build the world (as might be
maintained by radical social constructivism); it is the result of an
interaction between the person and his or her environment.”
(Alford, & Beck, 1997, p. 42).  
The fact that scientists do not immediately reject a theory when it
proves insufficient for explaining things does not mean they are totally irra-
tional in their backing up a particular paradigm. It does not imply, either,
that there is no objective criterion to differentiate between science and pseu-
do-science.
According to Lakatos (1970, 1978), the progress of science should not
be understood as a series of theories and verifications, or conjectures and
refutations, but as the result of the progress of various research pro-
grammes, competing in the development of better theories. Each pro-
gramme consists of a firm core or nucleus (formerly named theory) and
auxiliary theories which act as a protective belt against any attempt to fal-
sify the core. Auxiliary theories receive the first blows of contrasting tests;
they will therefore be adjusted again and again and even substituted before
even considering abandoning the programme and choosing a better one.
Lakatos’ programmes of scientific research do not exhibit an immedi-
ate rationality in their methodology. Differentiation criteria are posited a
posteriori but they do allow for an explanation of scientific revolutions
without falling into irrationality. Be that as it may, there are no refutations
without a better theory (Delgado, & Prieto, 1997).
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Summing up, from the standpoint of the new epistemology of cognitive
functioning as an attributive, constructive, interactive process between each
person and his environment, it is impossible to continue accepting the clas-
sical view of science. According to this view, science was defined as the
product of objective knowledge of an external reality which followed its
own laws, independently from the observer who tried to uncover its secrets.
Despite that, it is also incorrect to understand science as the consequence of
a totally irrational mind, completely immersed in the attribution patterns of
the researcher who, against all evidence to the contrary, continues holding
exclusively the facts which his perception allows him to see. The cognitive
theory of attribution permits a gradual change from the belief or attribution
system of people in general and scientists in particular, whenever such
beliefs prove to be insufficient or non-functional for explaining an environ-
ment that is constantly interacting with the individual, offering feedback and
correcting his attributions. It is obviously a slow process, since it implies
changing and sometimes substituting beliefs, partially and not wholly or
suddenly. This perspective would ground an understanding of science as a
construction dependent on a system of knowledge. This system would be
warranted by rationality through contrasting tests, and it is not an objective,
aseptic, and perfectly rational system; nor is it the reign of pure irrationali-
ty and attribution, reluctant to any clear signs of non-functionality.
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